Sports Law Blog
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Friday, June 24, 2016
 
A Sure Bet? The Legal Status of Daily Fantasy Sports

This past year, many law schools throughout the country held sports law symposiums on the legal status of "daily fantasy sports."  While most of these panels were unfortunately not transcribed, the Pace Intellectual Property, Sports & Entertainment Law Forum requested to publish my March 16, 2016 keynote address.  Here is a link to the keynote address, available for free download on SSRN.

In addition to this keynote address, here are some other law professor perspectives on the legal status of daily fantasy sports that I strongly recommend:



3.  My "Regulating Fantasy Sports" (To be published in Indiana L. J. later this year)

4.  Dean Jeffrey Standen's "The Special Exemption for Fantasy Sports" (Northern Kentucky University Law Review, 2015)



Monday, June 20, 2016
 
New York's Fantasy Sports Legislation May Face Constitutional Roadblock

The months-long legislative battle to legalize daily fantasy sports in New York mercifully ended last week with the passage of NY Senate Bill 8153 nearly 12 hours after the New York Assembly passed an identical version of the DFS bill. But while the legislative battle may be over (with New York Governor Andrew Cuomo expected to sign the measure into law within a matter of days), that does not necessarily mean that DFS has cleared its final legal hurdle in New York. A constitutional showdown may be on the horizon.

Like many states (such as New Jersey and Delaware, for example), New York has a constitutional prohibition against gambling (and, hence, any expansion of gambling) unless the constitution is “amended” to permit such activity. This prohibition is set forth in Article I, Section 9 of the New York State Constitution, which provides in relevant part:

[E]xcept as hereinafter provided, no lottery or the sale of lottery tickets, pool-selling, bookmaking, or any other kind of gambling, except lotteries operated by the state . . ., except pari-mutuel betting on horse races . . . , and except casino
gambling at no more than seven facilities. . . shall hereafter be authorized or allowed within this state; and the legislature shall pass appropriate laws to prevent offenses against any of the provisions of this section.

By its express terms, Article I, Section 9 prohibits any lottery or the sale of lottery tickets, pool-sellingbookmaking, or any other kind of gambling, except lotteries operated by the state, pari-mutuel betting on horse races, and casino gambling at no more than seven facilities. The provisions of Article I, Section 9 reflect the public policy of the State of New York against commercialized gambling.  New York Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Holbrook, 270 A.D.2d 31, 33-34, 704 N.Y.S.2d 52, 55 (1st Dep’t 2000) (citing International Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 18 A.D.2d 45, 49, 238 N.Y.S.2d 33, rev’s on other grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964) [stating that “[t]he unqualified command” of Article I, Section 9 “expresses a clear and deep-rooted policy against gambling.”])

As anyone who frequents a racetrack or buys a lottery ticket knows full well, there are exceptions to this supposedly “deep-rooted” public policy. But these exceptions—most notably, those for pari-mutuel wagering, the state lottery, and casino gambling limited to seven sites—were accomplished through a constitutional amendment rather than as a straight-up legislative enactment. 
In order to amend the New York Constitution, two successive sessions of the state legislature are required to approve the proposed amendment before it can be placed on the ballot. (N.Y. Const., Art. 19, § 1). The proposed amendment must then be passed at a referendum by a majority of New York voters to become a part of the state constitution. (Id.). This process takes a minimum of two years to accomplish, as two “separately-elected” legislatures (separated by a general election) must vote to place the constitutional amendment on the ballot before it is submitted to voters.  (Id.).  Moreover, the voter referendum (which can take place in a general or special election) would not take effect until January 1 of the year following the referendum.
Under this procedure, the earliest date that a constitutional amendment to legalize DFS could have taken effect is January 1, 2018, because it would have required (1) legislative approval during this year’s legislative session (which has since ended), (2) a second approval during next year’s legislative session, and, finally, (3) a majority of New York voters approving the measure in a referendum held in 2017.

Labels Are Not Controlling

While the current New York bills to legalize DFS attempt to skirt this framework by declaring that daily fantasy sports is a “game of skill,” and, therefore, not “gambling” under New York law, the labels selected by legislators would not be controlling. Rather, a court would look at what the law seeks to accomplish, rather than being straightjacketed by the particular labels selected by the legislative body. See, e.g.Meegan v. Brown, 16 N.Y.3d 395, 403 (2011) (“While examining the specific language of statutory provisions is part of our inquiry, we must also look to the underlying purpose and the statute's history as we are mindful that in “'the interpretation of statutes, the spirit and purpose of the act and the objects to be accomplished must be considered. The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle.’”] (internal citations omitted)People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y. 149, 152 (1937) (“In the interpretation of statutes, the spirit and purpose of the act and the objects to be accomplished must be considered. The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle. Literal meanings of words are not to be adhered to or suffered to defeat the general purpose and manifest policy intended to be promoted.”)

A recent example of this principle in play can be found in the litigation surrounding New Jersey’s efforts to legalize sports betting at the state’s racetracks and casinos. If you recall, New Jersey tried to navigate around the federal ban on state-sponsored sports betting by partially repealing its own state-law prohibitions criminalizing that activity, a legislative approach that was arguably endorsed in an earlier federal court ruling and in statements made by the four major professional sports leagues, the NCAA, and the U.S. Department of Justice (which have long been opposed to New Jersey’s efforts to legalize sports betting). Notwithstanding the fact that New Jersey claimed to be acting in reliance on these prior statements, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the New Jersey Legislature’s partial “repeal” of its state law prohibitions against sports betting was tantamount to an “authorization” of same (and therefore a violation of the federal PASPA law).[1] The Court explained:

The presence of the word “repeal” does not prevent us from examining what the provision actually does, and the Legislature’s use of the term does not change the fact that the 2014 Law [partially repealing the state-law prohibitions on sports betting] does not change the fact that the 2014 Law selectively grants permission to certain entities to engage in sports gambling. . . . While artfully couched in terms of a repealer, the 2014 Law essentially provides that, notwithstanding any other prohibition by law, casinos and racetracks shall hereafter be permitted to have sports gambling. This is not a repeal; it is an authorization.

(Opinion, at p. 18). Although this August 25, 2015 panel opinion was vacated as a result of the Third Circuit subsequently deciding to rehear the appeal in an “en banc” setting (no decision has been reached as of the date of this post), the principle of statutory interpretation articulated by the Third Circuit is a common one, applicable anytime a state legislature tries to use artful drafting to describe a proposed law in a way that is belied by the practical effect or true intent of the law.

So too here, a New York court could disregard the “game of skill” label strategically placed into the DFS bills by state legislators and look instead at what the law seeks to accomplish. The DFS bill might not fare well under such an analysis since it may be seen as an attempt to nullify a core principle of the state constitution.

Factors That A Court May Consider

What factors might a court consider?  For one thing, the new law provides for oversight and regulation by a state gambling commission, and mandates that all fantasy sports operators (whether of the daily or season-long variety) “register” with the New York State Gaming Commission, which would then “review” the application and decide whether to approve to deny it. The new law also gives the state gaming commission the authority to promulgate regulations governing fantasy sports. It is worth noting that the state gaming commission oversees only gambling activities, such as the lottery, casino gambling, tribal gaming, horse racing and charitable gaming, and has never before been charged with regulating a “non-gambling” activity. Until now, that is. It seems somewhat incongruous for legislators to assert that DFS is not gambling when the new law provides for oversight by a gambling commission and seeks to amend the state’s “racing, pari-mutuel wagering and breeding law” to accomplish that objective.

But that’s not all. The new law also provides for many “gambling-style” regulations. Among other things, the DFS bill (1) establishes an age minimum for players, (2) limits users to a single account, (3) requires operators to enable players to exclude themselves from contests (so-called “self-exclusion”) and take reasonable steps to prevent such players from entering a contest from which they have excluded themselves, and (4) mandates that DFS operators provide information concerning assistance for “compulsive play” (euphemism alert!) reminiscent of compulsive gambling safeguards typically found in other state gambling laws.  To my knowledge, there is no other “non-gambling” regime in the United States (and certainly not in New York) that has a similar regulatory structure.

A court might also consider statements made by the legislators themselves. One, in particular, comes to mind. Remember when state lawmakers rejected efforts by casino industry lobbyists to link daily fantasy sports contests with the state’s “brick-and-mortar” gaming venues out of concern that it would be viewed as “gambling” activity, with Senator Bonacic pointedly stating that “it could be a violation of betting on sports activity and it would create serious problems.” Does that problem (or, rather, perception) go away based simply on the identity of the operator? After all, the character of the fantasy sports contests would remain the same no matter who administers them. If it’s a “game of skill” when operated by DraftKings and FanDuel, it is no less skill-based when offered by a land-based racetrack or casino. Senator Bonacic’s comments about the “gambling” perception created by the involvement of brick-and-mortar casinos in DFS would seem to undercut that characterization.

Earlier statements by New York Assemblyman Dean Murray (one of the chief proponents of the DFS bill) also evince a belief that an amendment to the New York Constitution is required before the state could legalize daily fantasy sports. On December 2, 2015, Assemblyman Murray introduced a bill that would amend the New York Constitution to allow the state to authorize (as his bill coined it) “fantasy sports wagering.” The constitutional amendment bill (A08587) sought to add the following language to Article I, Section 9 of the New York State Constitution:

. . . and except for fantasy sports wagering on professional sports which may be authorized by the legislature, in a manner prescribed by the legislature for offering and conducting gaming and wagering, provided, however, that such authorizations shall be preceded by the elimination of the federal an on professional sports wagering. . . . 

Notably, Assemblyman Murray’s earlier bill contemplated two critical steps before DFS could be legalized in New York: the elimination of the federal ban on state-sponsored sports betting (in other words, the repeal or striking down of PASPA), followed by a state constitutional amendment that (if approved by New York voters) that would “authorize” the New York Legislature to legalize daily fantasy sports “wagering.” This mandated process—championed only a few months ago by Assemblyman Murray--is a quantum leap from the final approved bill, which bypasses the constitutional amendment process and ignores PASPA altogether. 

In a press release accompanying that earlier bill, Assemblyman Murray explained that “if the courts rule that [the DFS] sites constitute gambling, this measure serves as the first step in a constitutional amendment process in granting fantasy sports sites like FanDuel and DraftKings exemptions.”[2] Murray’s earlier bill was proposed against the backdrop of a New York State Supreme Court decision barring FanDuel and DraftKings from offering paid contests to New York State consumers. That decision, which is now on appeal, preliminarily concluded that DFS is gambling in contravention of the New York Penal Law and Article I, Section 9 of the New York State Constitution. A decision by the New York Appellate Division, First Department, is expected later this year. If the First Department affirms the lower court decision, a high likelihood in my view, then two courts will have ruled—at least preliminarily—that DFS constitutes gambling under the New York Penal Law and state constitution.   

Regardless, Assemblyman Murray’s earlier bill signaled his belief—only a few months ago—that a constitutional amendment (preceded by a voter referendum) would be required to legalize daily fantasy sports, particularly if the courts ruled that DFS is gambling. And so far the only court to speak on that issue has ruled—at least preliminarily—that DFS is gambling, with an appellate ruling expected later this year. 

But, perhaps, the most problematic factor for proponents of the DFS bill is the legal position advanced by the New York Attorney General in his still-pending lawsuit against FanDuel and DraftKings. In a series of court filings, the New York AG has consistently and unwaveringly maintained that daily fantasy sports is a form of gambling, and violates both the New York Penal Law and the state constitutional ban against gambling, bookmaking and pool-selling. He made these statements in the cease-and-desist notices[3] sent to DraftKings and FanDuel, in the original and amended complaints filed in the New York court action, in the briefing on the motion for a preliminary injunction,[4] and, finally, in opposing FanDuel’s and DraftKing’s request for a stay of the injunction pending the outcome of the appeal.

To be sure, in virtually every court filing made by Mr. Schneiderman in the New York court case, he unequivocally characterized DFS as “gambling” under state law and in contravention of Article I, Section 9 of the New York Constitution. Notably, AG Schneiderman did not retract or withdraw those statements as part of his office’s recent settlement with DraftKings and FanDuel. Do these prior statements lose any and all import simply because a state legislative body legalized DFS several months later? That may ultimately be for a New York court to decide. A court evaluating whether the DFS bill violates Article I, Section 9 of the New York State Constitution would likely accord significant weight to AG Schneiderman’s prior characterization of DFS as gambling, particularly since he is the highest-ranking law enforcement official in New York State and a New York state judge has already agreed with him.

Speaking of which, Justice Manuel Mendez’s written decision in early December would be another factor for a court to consider (particularly, if it is upheld on appeal). In his December 11, 2015 decision preliminarily enjoining FanDuel and DraftKings from offering paid DFS contests to New York consumers (which was later stayed by an appellate court pending the outcome of the appeal), Justice Mendez concluded that the New York Attorney General “has a greater likelihood of success on the merits [of his claim that the paid DFS contests offered by FanDuel and DraftKings are prohibited] under New York State Constitution Article I, § 9, and the definitions of gambling and ‘contest of chance’ as currently stated in [New York] Penal Law § 225.00(1)(2).” As SI’s Michael McCann and Will Green observed in their analysis of the ruling, Justice Mendez placed significance in the fact that Article I, Section 9 [of the Constitution] reflects—in Mendez’s words—“the public policy of the State of New York against commercialized gambling.” (Decision, at p. 4)

Who Has “Standing” to Challenge the DFS Law on Constitutional Grounds?

Since New York’s Attorney General has already declared that daily fantasy sports is illegal gambling and violates the state constitution, and a New York State trial court has preliminarily sided with the Attorney General’s interpretation, a constitutional challenge to a New York DFS law could succeed. The bigger question, however, is who exactly would bring such a lawsuit? There are several categories of potential plaintiffs, as reflected by the vigorous and well-coordinated (albeit, unsuccessful) opposition to the New York DFS bill. Opponents to the bill included, among others, the New York Gaming Association (which represents racetracks with video lottery terminal operations as well as other casino companies from upstate New York), the New York Conservative Party, the New York Independence Party, and the Coalition Against Gambling in New York (which generally opposes any expansion of legalized gambling in New York), as well as Roger Goodell’s first cousin (a New York State Assemblyman) and a host of other lawmakers, including Assemblyman Thomas Abinanti (D-Greenburgh), who raised the constitutional issue during the vigorous floor debate preceding the passage of the bill.[5]

A lawsuit backed or financed by New York’s casino industry, a vocal opponent of the DFS bill, seems like an obvious starting point. Lobbyists for New York’s casino industry have argued that the legalization of DFS—which they contend is an expansion of online gambling—will “cannibalize” their existing customer base and cause licensed “brick-and-mortar” gaming facilities to lose significant revenues. 

Another potential category of challengers, ironically, would be fantasy sports operators that offer only longer-duration contests (such as season-long fantasy leagues). Although earlier versions of the DFS bill had contained an exemption for season-long operators, the approved version (purportedly at the behest of New York Governor Andrew Cuomo) subjects such operators to the same tax rate (15%) on in-state revenues (after payouts to customers), registration fees, mandatory consumer protections, and regulatory compliance that apply to daily fantasy sports operators. This may be seen as objectionable to season-long operators, who would argue that their contests were previously declared “legal” by the New York Attorney General in the court case against FanDuel and DraftKings, thereby obviating the need for a new law specifically authorizing season-long fantasy sports contests. Thus, as a result of the new legislation, season-long operators (many of which are smaller companies than FanDuel and DraftKings) would be incurring a substantial increased cost via tax payments, registration fees and regulatory compliance that would not otherwise exist—or even be needed—in the absence of new legislation.

In addition, New York law recognizes broad ‘taxpayer’ standing to challenge state legislative enactments as contrary to New York’s constitution. In Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361(1975), the New York Court of Appeal liberalized taxpayer standing, holding that “[a] taxpayer has standing to challenge enactments of our State Legislature as contrary to the mandates of our State Constitution.” Id. at 362. That avenue exists to permit “‘taxpayers to challenge important governmental actions, despite such parties being otherwise insufficiently interested for [traditional] standing purposes, when ‘the failure to accord such standing would be in effect to erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial scrutiny of legislative action.’” Matter of Colella v. Board of Assessors of County of Nassau, 95 N.Y. 401, 410, 718 N.Y.S.2d 268 (2000) (quoting Boryszewski, 37 N.Y.2d at 364).

The enactment of a statewide DFS law—affecting potentially hundreds of thousands of players (although the industry claims it has more than three million customers in New York)—would seem to rise to the level of an “important government action” sufficient to allow taxpayer standing to challenge the legislation on constitutional grounds, particularly where the proposed law would involve the expenditure of state funds and state regulatory personnel to regulate the fantasy sports industry in New York. To deny taxpayer standing under these circumstances might cause an important governmental issue to be effectively insulated from judicial review, something that the New York Court of Appeal cautioned against in Boryszewski. In such cases, where the denial of standing would pose an “impenetrable barrier” to judicial scrutiny of legislative action, the New York courts, to quote the state’s highest court, have a duty to “open rather than close the door to the courthouse.” Saratoga Cty. Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 814-815 (2003). 

Under New York’s liberalized taxpayer standing framework, a taxpayer-citizen (e.g., basically any New York resident) could potentially bring a lawsuit challenging the New York DFS law as contrary to Article I, Section 9 of the New York State Constitution (even if they are not personally aggrieved in any tangible or economic way), although their legal standing would surely be challenged by the state.

But Can’t Legislators Decide What Is And What Isn’t “Gambling”?

In response to any legal challenge on this basis, proponents of the New York DFS law would likely counter that it is the prerogative of the state legislature to determine what is and what it not “gambling” under New York law. Along those lines, New York Assemblyman J. Gary Pretlow, who sponsored one of the two DFS bills, told lawmakers during last Friday’s floor vote that the state legislature has the authority to define what activities are legal in New York as defined by the state constitution, humorously remarking to one yellow-tie-wearing opponent of the DFS bill that “[w]e as a legislature can today say that wearing a yellow tie is illegal.” 

But while the legislature can enact “appropriate laws” in furtherance of the constitutional prohibition against gambling as a valid exercise of its police power, see Harris v. Econ. Opportunity Comm’n of Nassau Cty., 171 A.D.2d 223, 227, 575 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674-75 (2d Dep’t 1991), holding modified by Dalton v. Pataki, 11 A.D.2d 62, 780 N.Y.S.2d 47 (2d Dep’t 2004), it is another thing entirely to legalize a game or contest that has been determined by New York’s highest-ranking law enforcement official (and preliminary by one lower court) to constitute illegal gambling under New York’s Penal Law,  thereby expanding legal gambling in New York State without a constitutional amendment. In other words, while the legislature can certainly expand the definition of “gambling” to bring a game, device or contest within the statutory prohibition, that does not, a fortiori, mean that the legislature is also free to expand legal gambling outside of the mandatory constitutional amendment process.

Despite Assemblyman Pretlow’s colorful yellow-tie analogy, the state legislature did not change the definition of “gambling” under New York Penal Law 225.00 when it approved the two DFS bills. This is a critical point. While the legislature can certainly declare that “wearing a yellow tie” is illegal, the legislature in this instance did not criminalize an activity; it approved it., a particularly risky endeavor when it comes to gambling (which, subject to certain exceptions, is banned under the state constitution). For example, the legislature could have changed the statutory definition of “gambling” under Section 225.00 to require a “predominance” of luck or chance, which is the lower threshold used in many other states. Instead, the legislature kept the existing statutory definition of gambling (e.g., the “material degree/future contingent event” test) intact and simply removed “interactive fantasy sports contests” from its reach, a decision that legislators may soon come to regret if a lawsuit challenging the new law on constitutional grounds is brought. 

Final Thoughts and a Look Ahead

By legalizing DFS during the waning hours of the 2016 legislative session, did state lawmakers fumble the snap? If a constitutional amendment was required, opponents of the DFS bill (such as New York’s casino/racino industry, anti-gambling forces, or even ordinary taxpayer-citizens) could seize upon that failure and challenge the DFS law in court. Any such challenge would likely be joined with a request for a preliminary injunction, which, if granted, could sideline daily fantasy sports in New York for the foreseeable future while the court battle plays out. 

In my view, the New York Legislature chose the riskiest of three options. The safest play would have been to authorize a constitutional amendment (a process that could have taken up to two years longer) or change the New York penal law definition of “gambling” in a manner that would have definitionally excluded fantasy sports contests through a lowering of the statutory threshold for gambling. For example, under the predominant factor test employed in many other jurisdictions (such as Massachusetts), fantasy sports contests (whether of the daily or season-long variety) would probably not be considered gambling since it is generally recognized that success at such contests requires more skill than luck or chance. Having chosen the most expedient route—and one which is constitutionally risky—the Legislature may have opened the door to a potential legal challenge by one or more adversely affected parties or even by a taxpayer-citizen (or several of them).

If such a challenge were to emerge (and succeed), it could delay the effectiveness of the DFS law by several years, since an amendment to the state constitution via a voter referendum preceded by two consecutive sessions of legislative approval (a multi-year process) would then be required to legalize DFS. Were that scenario to play out in this fashion, legislators (and DFS lobbyists) might ultimately come to regret choosing the most expedient, albeit risky, path to legalization over fidelity and adherence to the state constitution.

-- Daniel Wallach




[1]  A more extreme example of such wordsmithing, as recalled by Yancey Roy (Newsday’s Albany Bureau Chief), is when Louisiana once excluded chickens from the definition of “animal” to allow cockfighting.
[2]   Along the same lines, New York Assemblyman J. Gary Pretlow  (the sponsor of the Assembly’s DFS bill which passed on Friday night) told GamblingCompliance (an online publication covering the global gaming industry) back in December 2015 that he would be willing to sponsor a constitutional amendment bill to legalize DFS.
[3]   In his original cease-and-desist notices sent to DraftKings and FanDuel on November 10, 2015, Attorney General Schneiderman wrote that “[t]he illegality of DFS is clear from any reasonable interpretation of our laws, beginning with the New York State Constitution,” (Notice, at p. 2). Earlier in the same notices, he stated that his office had “conclude[d]” that DraftKing’s and FanDuel’s operations “constitute illegal gambling under New York law because their customers “are clearly placing bets on events outside of their control or influence, specifically on the real-game performance of professional athletes. Further, each [DraftKings and FanDuel] wager represents a wager on a “contest of chance” where winning or losing depends on numerous elements of chance to a ‘material degree.’” (Id. at p. 1)
[4]  In his memorandum of law in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction (which was later granted by New York State Supreme Court Justice Manuel Mendez), Mr. Schneiderman wrote that DFS contests “fit squarely” within the definition of “gambling” under the New York Penal Law and the New York State Constitution, and “is nothing more than a rebranding of sports betting. It is plainly illegal.” He also opined in the same document that FanDuel and DraftKings “run afoul of [the New York Constitutional] prohibition [against] bookmaking, which is defined as the “acceptance of bets on a professional basis . . . upon the result of any trial or contest of skill, speed or power of endurance of man or beast.”  He described this as the “precise business” of both DFS operators and thus concluded that FanDuel and DraftKings are “in direct violation” of the state constitution. 
[5] During the floor debate, Assemblyman Abinanti insisted that “[t]hose who want to make fantasy sports legal in New York should be presenting to us a constitutional amendment.” He said that “[y]ou’ve got to tie yourself into a pretzel to somehow say this is not gambling. Just because some skill is involved doesn’t remove it from the category of gambling.”

Saturday, June 18, 2016
 
Why is the IOC punishing the innocent?

So let’s see if we understand this. Russian pole vaulter Yelena Isinbayeva, two time Olympic Gold Medal winner and current world record holder, is the greatest woman pole vaulter of all time. She has never tested positive for any banned substance.

Russian high jumper Anna Vladimirovna Chicherova has won the Gold Medal in the last two Olympics. She, too, has never tested positive for any banned substance, though a Russian track coach may have thrown her under the bus during the recent investigation.

Neither of these two high-flyng superb athletes can compete in the Rio Olympics because the IOC, historically one of the most corrupt entities in all of sports, has banned the entire Russian track team from the games because Russian coaches and administrators have been guilty of conspiring to evade the anti-doping regulations for years.

Of course, in my view, and that of 200 or so medical experts, no one should attend the games in Rio this summer because they should either be postponed or moved because of the Zika outbreak.

Still this action by the IOC seems especially broad-brushed. If an athlete tests positive for doping, or admits the transgression, the IOC is within its power to levy an appropriate sanction. But the innocent should not be punished for the crimes of his or her predecessors or higher-ups. If that were the case, the current members of the IOC should be dismissed because their predecessors were found to have taken bribes to award city selection sites.


It is not often I agree with Vladimir Putin but, Comrad, I feel your pain.

Sunday, June 05, 2016
 
Muhammad Ali and the Law

Some law-related thoughts following the death of Muhammad Ali.

Ali's direct contribution to U.S. law is the Supreme Court decision (in a case captioned Cassius Marsellus CLAY, Jr. also known as Muhammad Ali) reversing his conviction for refusing Army induction. It was a per curiam opinion, decided on fairly narrow grounds, so nothing that would become canon or significant precedent. Ali had sought a conscientious-objection exemption, which at the time required that the person have a sincere, religiously grounded objection to war in any form. Although a hearing officer found all three elements satisfied and recommended to the Appeal Board that his status be recognized, the Department of Justice wrote a letter to the Board recommending rejection of status, based on DOJ's purported findings that Ali failed to satisfy any of the three elements. The Appeal Board denied c/o status, disregarding the hearing officer's recommendation and without explanation, although the only other available basis was the DOJ letter. Before the Court, however, the government conceded that Ali's objection was sincere and religiously based. That brought the case within precedent holding that when the basis for a selection-service (or any other government) decision is uncertain but some possible bases are unlawful or erroneous, the entire decision must be vitiated. Rather than speculating whether the Board might have relied on the one remaining basis (the objection not being to war in any form), the Court rejected the Board's decision in toto. Justice Douglas concurred; he argued that the evidence showed Ali objected to all but Islamic war against nonbelievers, a "matter of conscience protected by the First Amendment which Congress has no power to qualify or dilute" by limiting c/o status only to those who object to all war in all forms. Justice Harlan concurred in the result, concluding that the DOJ letter could be read as claiming that Ali's assertion of C/O status was untimely, an error that called for reversal under the same line of cases as the majority relied on. The inside-the-Court workings leading to the decision were the subject of the otherwise-silly Muhammad Ali's Greatest Fight.

Ali is lionized for this stand, often through the modern laments about professional athletes refusing to take political stands or become politically involved the way Muhammad Ali did. But this has always seemed unfair. Ali was not lionized at the time. His actions were unpopular with the press and much of "mainstream" America (which did not like Ali to begin with, regarding him as an uppity loudmouth). The exception was African-Americans and young anti-war activists on college campuses. He was stripped of the heavyweight title and denied a license to fight in any state, most importantly New York (Madison Square Garden remained the center of the boxing world), costing him 3 1/2 years at the prime of his career. Although ultimately vindicated by SCOTUS, it came at tremendous cost to his career. Modern athletes asked to take political stands almost certainly do not face similar exile from their sports. But to normalize Ali* as the expectation for high-profile athletes seems unfair, a burden we do not place on other people, even other famous people, anywhere else in society.
[*] The other person forwarded as the aspiration is Jackie Robinson. But Robinson was somewhat forced to take a stand by circumstance--being the first African-American player in modern baseball made him inherently political. And the abuse Robinson took no doubt took a psychological and physical toll that contributed to him dying at age 53.
Case in point from the Daily News, extolling Ali for "offer[ing] a roadmap for today’s athlete to be an activist," while 1) eliding that in 1967, this columnist almost certainly would have been lining up to excoriate Ali for talking to much and dodging the draft, and 2) perpetuating the idea that the only true activist is the one who sacrifices millions of dollars and the prime of his career, something we ask of no one else.  The Big Lead provides a good critique. At the same time, it understates the point in saying "[t]here are few, if any, athletes who can match Ali’s legacy fighting for social issues. That’s what made him such an important figure." Ali's legacy is, in part, a unique product of circumstances and initially unlawful action by the United States. That is why no one can match it.

Update: This Slate piece goes into detail on a lot of these themes, including more background on DOJ's efforts to influence the Appeal Board and on the prosecution, which were influenced by congressional and administration pressure.

Monday, May 23, 2016
 
The Notorious RBG & Tom Brady

If you're a fan of the New England Patriots, or believe the NFL has expanded the power of the commissioner's office illegally, you have yet another reason to believe in the wisdom of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Tom Brady's appeal to the 2nd Circuit Court (filed today) requires 7 of the 13 judges to conclude the case requires further scrutiny. If they do authorize an en banc hearing, 8 out of 14 judges will need convincing the decision was extraordinary, with wide-ranging implications for parties other than Brady and the NFLPA.

While the 2nd Circuit typically respects three-judge panel decisions, because the lone dissent vote was cast by Robert Katzmann, the chief justice of the entire 2nd Circuit, there appears to be a greater chance than usual to grant an en banc hearing. A decision on an en banc hearing should be released by July 4th. If granted, Brady's suspension will be stayed until a final ruling. If denied, he and the NFLPA have a right to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Brady and his legal team would likely ask the 2nd Circuit for a stay (suspension of his punishment) until the Supreme Court decides on whether or not to hear the case. The Supreme Court's decision will rest on whether there are critical labor law issues, impacting parties well beyond football, needing a clear resolution. The 2nd Circuit has the right to reject that appeal, reinstating the four-game suspension for this season. Finally, as one last Hail Mary, Brady could ask the Supreme Court for a stay until they decide whether to hear the case.

If the 2nd Circuit denies a stay request, there is one final person who determines IF Brady's receives a stay while the Supreme Court decides? The Supreme Court justice assigned to the 2nd Circuit, Ruth Bader Ginsburg. And what does the Notorious RBG think of dissenting opinions?

"Dissents speak to a future age. It's not simply to say, 'my colleagues are wrong and I would do it this way,' but the greatest dissents do become court opinions." ~ Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

Monday, May 09, 2016
 
Adding to list of summer sports law programs...Florida Coastal School of Law

As we blogged about last month, there are many great summer sports law programs---including at the University of Oregon Law School, the University of New Hampshire School of Law and Case Western Reserve Law School. Another great program can be found at Florida Coastal School of Law. It will run from May 16 to June 24. Be sure to check out the link for all of the details.

Tuesday, April 26, 2016
 
Delayed Justice: Jury verdict in "The Hillsborough Disaster"

The top Sports Law story in the world today?

No, not the awful ruling by the Second Circuit reinstating the suspension of Tom Brady for, more probably than not, conspiring to deflate a few footballs contrary to the laws of physics.

A far more significant event occurred across the pond where justice was actually served.

After two years of hearing evidence, a jury in Liverpool has found that soccer fans were “unlawfully killed” in what became known as the Hillsborough Disaster in 1989. The event was a match between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest at Hillsborough Stadium. Police and stadium personnel had set up pens without adequate turnstiles to prevent fans from confronting one another. The result was chaos as 96 died from crush injuries and 796 lay injured. Originally, the authorities blamed the fans and circulated false stories about individuals acting in a manner justifying police actions.

The jurors concluded the fans were in no way responsible for the incident and that the police, stadium personnel, and emergency responders were entirely to blame for the tragedy. When the verdict was announced, tears were shed and those in attendance rose and applauded the jury.

Justice may have been delayed after nearly 30 years but it was not denied. The same cannot be said for what happened at Foley Square in a case of far less importance to the world of sports, since it was literally, like the show Seinfeld, about nothing.

Tuesday, April 19, 2016
 
University of New Hampshire Summer Sports Law Institute



This summer at the University of New Hampshire Durham campus we will be offering 4 outstanding sports law courses--taught by leading experts--as part of our 4-week UNH Law Summer Sports Law Institute from May 23 to June 17. The UNH Law Summer Sports Law Institute is part of the highly-acclaimed UNH Law and Franklin Pierce Center for IP's Intellectual Property Summer Institute. Here is more information on the courses:


Week 1, May 23 to 27 

NCAA Division I Legislation and Compliance, taught by Professor Katherine Sulentic, the Associate Director of Enforcement on the NCAA enforcement staff and Chair of the Academic Integrity Unit. This class is ideal for those who intend to practice law in the college sports industry and those who seek a mastery of NCAA compliance and enforcement issues.








Week 2, May 31 to June 3

Sports Law and Investigative Reporting, taught by Professor B.J. SchecterSports Illustrated's executive editor and editor of Campus Rush, and me. This class is ideal for law students and attorneys who want to gain a better understanding of journalism and investigative reporting and for journalists who want to gain a better understanding of the legal system.








Week 3, June 6 to 10

Fantasy Sports and Gaming Law, taught by Professor Daniel Wallach, a shareholder at Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. and a leading commentator on all things legal and business related to the fantasy sports and gaming industries--Professor Wallach is the gaming law guru. This course is ideal for those who want to gain a better understanding of the growing and transformative body of law in the fantasy sports and sports gaming industries--two of the fastest growing industries.







Week 4, June 13 to 17

Sports Ethics and Bioethics: Playing Fair and the Law, taught by Professor Alan Milstein, a shareholder of Sherman Silverstein and Chairman of the Firm's Litigation Department and also a leading commentator on sports law and bioethics and the law. Professor Milstein has litigated on behalf of Allen Iverson, Carmelo Anthony, Eddy Curry, Allen Houston, Maurice Clarett and other sports figures. This class is ideal for those who want to learn more about connections between sports, law, health and bioethics. You will hear first-hand from the attorney who represented Eddy Curry in his DNA test dispute with the Chicago Bulls.







A few quick but important items:
  • Each class is 1 credit, at a cost of $1,370 ($1,233 for NH residents), and each class is open to law students, attorneys, compliance officers, graduate students, journalists, businesspersons and many others. You can take all or any of the courses.
  • For those coming from out of town, housing and meal plans are available at a very low cost.
  • You can take the class physically on the UNH Durham campus or virtually on the UNH Concord campus.
  • If you're interested in taking a class for credit, click here; if you're interested in taking a class but not-for-credit, click here.
  • New Hampshire--which Politico Magazine recently ranked as the #1 state in terms of such factors as education, health, income and employment--usually offers amazing weather over the summer and there are tons of fun things to do while you're up here.
  • If you have any questions, shoot me an email at michael.mccann[a]law.unh.edu. Hope to see you this summer!

 
Oregon Law Summer Sports Institute


I'm excited to be back teaching in the Oregon Law Summer Sports Institute, which will run from July 6 to August 5, 2016 in Eugene, Oregon. I'll be teaching on the intersection between media law and sports law--including in the context of Deflategate--and I'll be presenting on NCAA legal issues as well.

Run by Oregon law professor Robert Illig, the Oregon Law Summer Sports Institute is a terrific program and includes a wide variety of sports law classes and outstanding faculty members. Be sure to check it out.

 
Great Lake Sports and Entertainment Law Academy

If you are interested in studying sports law, check out the Great Lake Sports and Entertainment Law Academy, hosted by Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and Case Western Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio from May 16 to June 3. It is led by the legendary Peter Carfagna and top professor Craig Nard, and the program offers an impressive list of courses.

Sunday, April 17, 2016
 
Not an infield fly

On Sunday, Tigers second baseman Ian Kinsler* intentionally failed to catch an infield pop-up with a runner on first and none out, in order to get a force out at second base on a speedy runner at first, replacing him with the batter, a slower runner. (Video in the link). After some initial confusion, the runner at first was called out and the batter was on first base.
[*] Apropos of nothing, Kinsler is Jewish, so this ties back to the ongoing fascination with the presence/increase of Jewish athletes.
Some comments after the jump.
Read more »

Saturday, April 16, 2016
 
New Law Review Article Addresses How to Regulate Daily Fantasy Sports


It is my pleasure to announce the acceptance for publication in Indiana Law Journal of the third article in my fantasy sports trilogy, entitled "Regulating Fantasy Sports: A Practical Guide to State Gambling Laws, and a Proposed Framework for Future State Legislation."

This article analyzes how U.S. states currently regulate the fantasy sports marketplace, and proposes a framework for future state laws to effectively regulate both traditional fantasy sports and "daily fantasy sports."  The final section of this article proposes a comprehensive framework that would allow for states to effectively regulate both traditional fantasy sports and 'daily fantasy sports' in a meaningful way, in conjunction with existing state gambling laws.

With the upcoming publication of "Regulating Fantasy Sports" in Indiana Law Journal later this year, the full trilogy for full-length fantasy sports articles now include the following.

1.  A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law (Harvard Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law, Winter 2012)

2. Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports (Illinois Law Review, Winter 2016).

3.  Regulating Fantasy Sports: A Practical Guide to State Gambling Laws, and a Proposed Framework for Future State Legislation. (Indiana Law Journal, Fall 2016).


Tuesday, March 22, 2016
 
Debating the Infield Fly Rule in Penn Law Review

In December, Penn Law Review published A Step Aside: Time to Drop the Infield Fly Rule and End a Common Law Anomaly, by U.S. District Judge Andrew J. Guilford and his law clerk, Joel Mallord. While there have been rumblings in many places against the Infield Fly Rule, this was the first full, sustained scholarly critique of the rule.

My response, Just a Bit Aside: Perverse Incentives, Cost-Benefit Imbalances, and the Infield Fly Rule, has now been published on Penn Law Review Online.


 
How Antitrust Law Could Reform College Football: Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Hope for Tangible Change

Image result for rutgers football
Last spring, Rutgers Law Review held its annual symposium on the legal issues surrounding professional and college football.  I gave the symposium's keynote address, entitled "How Antitrust Law Could Reform College Football: Section 1 of the Sherman Act and the Hope for Tangible Change."

My keynote address is now available for download here, in article form.  The thrust of my speech is that if the antitrust plaintiffs ultimately prevail in the O'Bannon and Jenkins, it would enhance college football by leading to an allocation of resources that is more equitable for all stakeholder groups, including both the athletes and consumers.






Saturday, March 19, 2016
 
Video and getting a call "right"

I have always been against instant replay, being one of those who enjoys the "human element" and the "flow" of the games. I recognize the countervailing argument for getting it "right" by available means. But this play, from St. Joseph's NCAA Round One victory over Cincinnati last night, calls into question what we mean by getting it "right." Cincy's game-tying dunk at the buzzer, initially called good, was waved off following video review. Beginning at the 2:00 mark, you can see the extreme slow-motion/frozen video that showed he still had his hand on the ball (pushing it down through the rim) when the red light went on.*
[*] Leave to one side the oddity that dunking the ball worked to the player's disadvantage in this instance, by requiring him to keep his hand on the ball longer than if he had shot a lay-up or dropped the ball through the hoop from above the rim (what players did during the NCAA's absurd no-dunking days from 1967-76).
But we only could see the "right" call via video slowed to a speed so far beyond the ability of the human eye and brain. Do we really need college basketball games to be decided by such super-sensory means or that establish correctness at a meta-physical level? Is it fair to say the refs got the call "wrong" initially, when the wrongness could be established only by this extreme use of video? And should we understand the "truth" of what happened by what we can perceive or what video reveals at that heightened meta-physical level?**
[**] Recall that the lawyers who successfully defended the LAPD officers in the Rodney King beating in state court did just this with that video: Slowing it down to the frame level so as to reveal movements by King that might have shown continued resistance, even if there was no way anyone could have perceived them. This strategy has only become easier with the advances in video technology.