Christopher Bidlack, Comment, The prohibition of prosthetic limbs in American sports: the issues and the role of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW 613 (2009)

Daniel Bilsky, From parts unknown: WWE v. Jim Hellwig in the ultimate battle for character copyright, 19 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW 419 (2009)

Ethan Flatt, Note, Solidifying the defensive line: the NFL Network’s current position under antitrust law and how it can be improved, 11 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF ENTERTAINMENT & TECHNOLOGY LAW 637 (2009)

Brian P. Harlan, Note, The California Supreme Court should take a mulligan: how the Court shanked by applying the primary assumption of risk doctrine to golf, 29 LOYOLA L.A. ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW 91 (2008-2009)

Holli N. Heiles, Comment, Baseball’s “growth” problem: can Congress require Major League Baseball to test its athletes for human growth hormone? A proposal, 62 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW 315 (2009)

Sarah R. Heisler, Note, Steroid regulation in professional sports: Sarbanes-Oxley as a guide. 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL 199 (2009)

Andrew D. Hohenstein, Comment, Team physicians: adhering to the Hippocratic Oath or just plain hypocrites?, 19 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW 579 (2009)

Robert Holo and Jonathan Talansky, Taxing the business of sports, 9 FLORIDA TAX REVIEW 161 (2008)

Christopher J. Kaufman, Comment, Unsportsmanlike conduct: 15-yard penalty and loss of free speech in public university sports stadiums, 57 UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS LAW REVIEW 1235 (2009)

Erick S. Lee, Play ball!: substituting current federal non-regulation of fantasy sports leagues with limited supervision of hyper-competitive leagues, 29 LOYOLA L.A. ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW 53 (2008-2009)

Rick J. Lopez, Comment, Signing bonus skimming and a premature call for a global draft in Major League Baseball, 41 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL 349 (2009)

Michael C. Macchiarola, Securities linked to the performance of Tiger Woods? Not such a long shot, 42 CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW 29 (2008)

James T. McKeown, 2008 antitrust developments in professional sports: to the single entity and beyond, 19 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW 363 (2009)

Alan Pogroszewski, When is a CPA as important as your ERA? A comprehensive evaluation and examination of state tax issues on professional athletes, 19 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW 395 (2009)

Ann Scales, Student gladiators and sexual assault: a new analysis of liability for injuries inflicted by college athletes, 15 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW 205 (2009)

Kaitlyn Anne Wild, 2008 annual survey: recent developments in sports law, 19 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW 437 (2009)

Sara Young, Note, Does a coach owe players a fiduciary duty? Examining the relationship between coach and team, 35 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW 475 (2009)

Three years ago, a small company called SportsFuzion saw an opportunity. They convinced the Basketball of Hall of Fame to sell them "exclusive worldwide rights to the Hall of Fame's trade names, logos, trademarks, designs, and photos for use in sportswear." At the time, those rights didn't seem that valuable, because who buys a hat that says "Hall of Fame" on it? But SportsFuzion, was thinking ahead because they knew that in three years Michael Jordan would be in the Hall of Fame, and people will buy anything even remotely associated with Michael Jordan.

So, they took their idea—and their licensing rights—to Nike and made their pitch. And Nike passed. Michael Jordan and the Hall of Fame isn't really going to work for Brand Jordan. Thanks, but no thanks.

Then two months later, the Hall of Fame suddenly decides they don't want to be in business with SportsFuzion. They want to renegotiate their contract. Oh, and look at that ... Nike is now selling their own Jordan Hall of Fame gear!

While the Rooney Rule has worked to help diversify the NFL coaching ranks, NCAA President Myles Brand and Vice President of Diversity and Inclusion Charlotte Westerhaus maintain a similar rule for college athletics won't work.

"The 'Rooney Rule' is an interviewing rule," writes Westerhaus in a recent blog post. "More candidates than ever before were interviewed last fall without an interview mandate similar to the 'Rooney Rule' and without the possibility of sanctions for noncompliance. What was the end result? Only four African Americans were hired as head football coaches of color in Division I FBS. This simply is not good enough.

"The NCAA is not opposed to equal opportunity within the interview process. But what is needed now is an end to side-stepping the crux of the hiring dilemma. Interviewing is not hiring. What is needed is more hires of head football coaches of color, not mandated interviews and the continued perpetuation of false hope."

the stakes are high. If the Supreme Court rules that the league and its teams do not constitute a single entity for antitrust purposes, then all exclusive marketing arrangements likely would be scuttled. For example, EA would likely lose exclusive rights to the team names and logos for the Madden video game — and the league would lose the extra money that comes from exclusivity.

• First, the 2002 First Circuit case Fraser v. Major League Soccer held that the single-entity defense to antitrust law is unlikely to apply to any centrally-planned sports league that allocates a share of specific team revenues to individual investor-operators.

• Second, Fraser v. Major League Soccer also held that the labor practices of a professional sports league, irrespective of its structure, cannot violate antitrust law so long as the league competes in a worldwide market for player labor and thus lacks market power.
  

• Finally, the more recent Seventh Circuit case American Needle v. National Football League extends the potential insulation from antitrust liability to certain business activities of even traditionally structured sports leagues. (Of course, some of us at Sports Law Blog, including myself, believe the American Needle opinion was poorly decided.)
  

There are four main ways to receive home video service in the United States: traditional over-the-air broadcast, cable, satellite and now over lines from new competitors such as AT&T and Verizon, who have invested billions in infrastructure and marketing. This kind of competition is good because it means lower prices, more innovation and better customer service. It translates into lower bills for consumers as well as an increasing number of HD and non-HD channels, better DVR technology and bundled service. Consumers win as a result of this highly competitive marketplace.

That is, unless you are a sports fan living in San Diego or Philadelphia. The 1992 Cable Act has program access requirements that promote competition and diversity in video programming. The law prevents cable companies from acting in an unfair or anti-competitive manner when selling the huge amount of cable channels and programming that they own.

So why isn't what is happening in San Diego and Philadelphia illegal? In fact, it would be except for a technicality. At the moment the Federal Communications Commission is reviewing the rule that allows this to occur – the “terrestrial loophole” in the federal Cable Act. By their own admission, cable companies are taking advantage of this outdated exception to program-access laws. The loophole makes the law applicable only to satellite-delivered programming and not to programs delivered via a terrestrial signal. It's a technicality that serves no rational purpose.

Regardless of the Ninth Circuit's forthcoming decision (or of an unlikely review by the U.S. Supreme Court), a number of people are aware of the remaining 102 names. Any of those persons has the capacity to leak the names, which they might be tempted to do for a variety of reasons. They may, for instance, dislike one or more of the named players and want to settle a score. Or perhaps their intentions are more sinister: they could threaten to disclose a name or names unless compensated in a blackmail scheme.

Officials at the MLBPA and MLB are most likely aware of the names, as are various federal officials, including the agents who seized the computers, as well as judges, clerks, prosecutors and their assistants. Certain player agents and attorneys may also be aware of the list. In short, a lot of people have probably seen the list.

Granted, all of these persons "in the know" are bound by professional duties of confidentially, violations for which can trigger civil consequences. A baseball agent, for instance, could risk fine, suspension, or even decertification by the MLBPA, which certifies agents who have clients on 40-man rosters. The union itself is dissuaded from disclosing the names. Under federal labor laws, the MLBPA and its officials owe duties of trust and competence to each of its players. Should the MLBPA disclose the 104 players' names, the named players would be entitled to sue the MLBPA for breach of duties; they could also file a grievance with the National Labor Relations Board. Players' damages could be shown through reputational harm and potential loss of endorsement deals.

Second, although a person can commit perjury through a written statement, the government may place significance in the fact that Sosa did not verbally make the potentially-incriminating comments. Sosa, in fact, claimed he did not feel comfortable speaking because of his command of the English language. If Sosa's English was not perfect, then did he fully understand the meaning of the written statement? If not, could he have "knowingly" lied?

Plus, Goodell has normally waited for the disposition of players' legal woes before imposing a punishment. He waited for Michael Vick's guilty plea in 2007, for instance, and did the same for Tank Johnson, who pled guilty to misdemeanor weapon charges, also in 2007. Likewise, Goodell declined to sanction Randy Moss in January 2008 after a restraining order was issued against him. Although he is not obligated to adopt a "presumption of innocence" standard when sanctioning players, Goodell has generally done so.

Goodell is also not bound by his own precedent, meaning he need not follow a particular script or set of rules gleamed from his earlier punishments. He also needn't worry about his decision to punish being reversed or modified on appeal: under the policy, any appeal goes right back to him.

. . . Goodell, son of the late U.S. Senator Charles Goodell (R-NY) and son-in-law of former White House Chief of Staff Sam Skinner, might be attune to the unusually politicized dynamics of Burress' case. New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, a leading advocate of the law used to prosecute Burress, has stressed that Burress should be prosecuted "to the fullest extent of the law" for otherwise there could be "a sham, a mockery of the law." Should Goodell allow Burress to sign a multimillion dollar contract with a team, particularly with the nearby New York Jets, it may be viewed disapprovingly by the Mayor.

Judge Stuck Between a Rock, Hard Place: Coyotes Bankruptcy; Would Prefer if NHL, Balsillie worked Out a Deal

Money matters in bankruptcy court

NHL aware of legal ‘morass’: U.S. Antitrust Laws; Court filing notes ambiguous rules for sports leagues

“Confusion” over league powers could weaken NHL Coyote’s case