"I'll even wear a kilt and shave my legs. My whole point is where do we draw the line? If we accept that women can enter our tournaments, then it applies that men can play with women."

Head trauma from a falling goalpost caused the death of a student at the University of Minnesota, Morris over the weekend, according to an autopsy report released Monday.

Rick Rose, 20, a junior from Benton City, Wash., died at a hospital after he and other students rushed onto the Morris football field to tear down a goalpost after the school's team defeated Crown College on Saturday. No one else was injured.

It was homecoming and the final game at Cougar Field, which is being replaced after 35 years. Morris Chancellor Sam Schuman said it appeared that "a small group of overly enthusiastic students" acted without thinking carefully.

• Blount received $20,000 in cash from an alumnus of the University of Louisville on a recruiting trip;

• Blount received cash from an alumnus of the University of Cincinnati on a recruiting trip, apparently on instruction from coach Bob Huggins;

• Blount received periodic cash payments from University of Pittsburgh boosters (Blount played there for two years); and
  

• Blount took steroids (with assistance from Sanginti).
  

A man accused of pretending to be Pittsburgh Steelers quarterbacks was fined $300.

Brian Jackson of Brentwood pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct charges yesterday. Authorities say Jackson pretended to be quarterbacks Ben Roethlisberger and Brian St. Pierre to two women so he could date them. Jackson gave one of the women a signed football and signed Roethlisberger's name on a Steelers jersey owned by the woman's neighbor.

A judge accepted Jackson's plea deal to a reduced charge because Jackson completed a psychological evaluation and has stayed away from his accusers.

Carfagna has witnessed the transformation of sports negotiation from a fledgling field marked by simple agreements and modest sums into a sophisticated specialty involving highly detailed contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars, with clauses covering every imaginable contingency.

"When I came out of law school, sports law was mainly just a small part of labor law," Carfagna said. "Now it's an increasingly competitive set of specialties, and it's morphing fast into new areas."

The term "sports law," once a rubric for rather straightforward employment contracts between professional athletes and teams, now encompasses an expanding variety of negotiated agreements. According to Professor Paul Weiler LL.M. '65, who supervised Carfagna's third-year paper in 1979, it covers sports marketing deals, contracts between players' unions and leagues, deals between leagues and television or radio networks for broadcast rights, representation agreements between athletes and agents, endorsement agreements, licensing agreements with makers of sports gear and memorabilia, amateur eligibility rules, antitrust issues, insurance policies spreading the risks of player injuries and other eventualities, franchise relocation agreements and stadium subsidies--in sum, contracts for every aspect of the commerce of sports.

A recent trend, Carfagna says, is an almost obsessive attention now paid to morals clauses in sports contracts, especially in the aftermath of the O.J. Simpson and Kobe Bryant criminal cases. "Morals clauses are now the most heavily negotiated terms," he said. "And the steroid scandal in Major League Baseball is putting even more pressure on sponsors to negotiate escape clauses in contracts with athletes who test positive for illegal performance-enhancing drugs."

Lawyers hash out as much as they can foresee before a contract is finalized, says Michael McCann LL.M. '05, who, together with Greg Skidmore '05, maintains a popular sports law blog, sports-law.blogspot.com. Must an athlete be convicted of a crime before a company will be released from an endorsement contract? If so, must it be a felony? Is a mere allegation or charge sufficient to void a contract? Does a single positive test for steroids give Nike an out? What about gambling, domestic violence, an admitted extramarital affair or anything in an athlete's private life that does reputational harm--will an allegation or admission release a company from continuing to honor a contract?

The Baltimore Orioles recently invoked the morals clause to void the remainder of the contract of pitcher Sidney Ponson after his third arrest for alcohol-related violations. Ponson had one year left to play under a contract that would have paid him $10 million in 2006.

The latest twist in the evolution of morals clauses, said McCann, is the "reverse morals clause," which gives athletes the right to cancel an endorsement deal with a corporation whose reputation is harmed by revelations of corporate malfeasance. Agents have been negotiating such clauses in the wake of Enron and other recent scandals, he says. "I don't know of an athlete invoking a reverse morals clause yet, but it's bound to happen," he added. In addition to running his blog, McCann teaches sports law at Mississippi College School of Law in Jackson.

Carfagna's gravitation to sports law seems to have been natural. After playing football for Harvard College and capping his academic and athletic accomplishments with a Rhodes Scholarship, the self-described "sports nut" attended Harvard Law School just when Weiler was showing that sports law was a subject of serious merit. After graduating, Carfagna practiced law at Jones Day in Cleveland, where he worked frequently on IMG matters. He paid his dues writing up some of the informal understandings that Arnold Palmer had reached with Mark McCormack, IMG's founder. He moved to IMG's legal department in 1994. In 1996, Carfagna found himself drafting Tiger Woods' first representation agreement. Woods, then a junior at Stanford, was trying to decide whether to join the professional golf circuit.

One possibility is that tennis and golf, the "country club" sports, are seen as more respectable than basketball. Fans may be more willing to tolerate younger players in these "dignified" sports that have well-established rules of etiquette (i.e., quiet for the serve and self-penalization in golf). Tuning into SportsCenter, a fan's view of basketball is dunks, show-boating and tattoos.

Along the same vein, no one has ever done a breakdown of the ages of golfers and tennis players that have been arrested. For the most part, the mug shots of golfers and tennis players do not regularly appear on the nightly news. The better overall image of these sports may cause fans to be more accepting of younger players -- after all, there is far less chance that they will be "corrupted."

Two Oklahoma State men's basketball players were among three people who were arrested early Friday morning when Stillwater Police were summoned to break up a riot of more than 300 people at a Whataburger restaurant.

Senior guard Cheyne Gadson, 22, was arrested for obstructing an officer, public intoxication and resisting an officer. Tony Allen, 19, was arrested for obstruction, assault and resisting.

OSU athletic director Harry Birdwell and coach Eddie Sutton declined comment. One OSU official said the incident would be handled within the program.

According to Stillwater Police Chief Norman McNickle, two officers responded to a report around 2:30 a.m. Officers reported the riot apparently started when several people jumped one man and began beating him.

McNickle was quoted in the Stillwater NewsPress that "apparently there had been several fights all evening" at other locations around Stillwater. McNickle said two groups, mostly rivals from OSU and Langston University, ended up at Whataburger, and the fighting continued.

"Michelle Wie has proven she can play with anyone, male or female. So why leave all that money on the table? She's uncommonly mature and will survive any perceived social crisis." Bob Ryan, Quick Shots, Boston Globe, Oct. 9, 2005, at D2

"It's interesting. People don't want to talk about Michelle Wie's golf game. They want to discuss her presence. Graceful and confident, poised and mature." Doug Haller, Million Dollar Baby, Arizona Republic, Oct. 2005, at 1A

"The crowds following her grew that afternoon and they have not gone away. What they saw was a player with a swing of beauty, a person blessed with poise who was comfortable in the spotlight, mature way beyond her years." Peter Dixon, Wie Ready to Make Big Splash Into Paid Ranks, London Times, Oct. 5, 2005, at 84

"When it comes to the precocious Wie, very little that surrounds her is routine." Fred Lewis, Honolulu Advertiser, Oct. 17, 2005, at 1D

"Precocious pro Michelle Wie would love to qualify for the British Open Championship, . . . " Mixed Response, Perth (Australia) Sunday Times, Oct. 16, 2005

"She's exceptionally mature." B.J. Wie, professor of Transportation at the University of Hawaii and Michelle's dad, quoted by Barker Davis, Wie Goes from Prodigy to Pro, Washington Times, Oct. 6, 2005, at C1

Umpires often have no choice but to use discretion. They cannot invoke the infield fly rule unless an infielder can catch the ball "with ordinary effort." And they must call a balk on a pitcher trying to pick off a runner on first if he does not "step directly" towards the base. Umpires spend years learning how to interpret common legislative terms like "ordinary" and "directly."

So within a certain range, umpires have leeway. But baseball doesn't tolerate an umpire whose judgment is on the fringe. Indeed, the umpire who is overly technical in calling balks, or who sees balks when none occur, is too far outside the mainstream to last.

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the juvenile death penalty was "cruel and unusual punishment." The majority and dissents used different methods to decide what those words mean. Both had to justify their methods of interpretation; neither could rely solely on the text of the Eighth Amendment.

This nuance, however, seems to be lost on many politicians. "What our legal system demands," said Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama, "is a fair and unbiased umpire, one who calls the game according to the existing rules." Well, yes, but the best umpires are honest enough to acknowledge that they have an approach to umpiring. The myth of the neutral umpire is no more tenable than that of the neutral justice. When the Senate considers Harriet Miers, the philosophy behind her decision-making is what matters, especially since she doesn't have a minor-league record.

• Eight-time NBA All-Star
• 2003-04 NBA MVP
• Six-time All-NBA
• Six-time All-Defensive (2000-05)

"First of all, Kevin Garnett is not ready to play in the NBA. He just isn't close. We're going to assume his coach simply hasn't seen enough NBA games, live, up-close. The kid isn't physically ready to play under the basket in the Big Ten, much less against Hakeem Olajuwon and David Robinson. His skill level isn't high enough; he isn't savvy enough." Michael Wilbon, Prep Star Garnett is NBA's Fool Gold, Washington Post, May 28, 1995, at D14

"Is Kevin Garnett ready for it all? Obviously, hell, no. It is such a fragile proposition -- the thought someone could enter the NBA so young, no matter how gifted and tall and extraordinarily athletic, and be better off in the long term. The years after high school are perhaps the most crucial in human development, particularly for a basketball phenom, who should grow socially and scholastically in college while refining raw skills in the gym against peers. In the pros? He grows up in airports and Hyatts, trying to learn the big time during rare practices in a whirlwind season, assuming the team isn't so rotten that skill growth is impossible." Jay Mariotti, Does Garnett Have Any Idea of What He is Getting Into?, Chicago Sun-Times, June 20, 1995, at 87

"If David Stern arranges anything in his commissionership, he will make sure Garnett, Thomas and the expansion Toronto Raptors are joined in the draft Wednesday. This is perhaps the only way a delicate, perilous hoop experiment -- a 19-year-old out of high school joining the manliest league on Earth -- can work without disaster. In the sporting sense, how tragic if Garnett took the big money, wasn't able to mature and went poof in four years." Jay Mariotti, For Garnett to Succeed, Isiah Must Rescue Him, Chicago Sun-Times, June 27, 1995, at 91

"The NBA and its stressed-out coaches are hardly eager to welcome skinny Joe Smith or the unprepared Wallace or preposterous Kevin Garnett, the high school senior who wants to pull a Moses Malone move. Neither their bodies nor their minds are fully developed. Shawn Bradley is costing the 76ers $44 million. Immaturity has damaged the image of Kenny Anderson and Chris Webber. Jason Kidd did fine, but Grant Hill, who graduated from Duke, was the most successful and respected rookie." Linda Robertson, NBA Riches Have a Cost, Austin American-Statesman, May 19, 2005, at C1

"Emotionally, socially, physically, Kevin Garnett will be immature relative to the guys he will be around. In terms of how he relates to fans, how he relates to girls, how he relates to having all that money. There's nothing good about this." University of Utah coach Rick Majerus quoted by Barry Temkin, Garnett to Gain Riches, Lose Youth, Chicago Tribune, June 27, 1995, at N1

"If Kevin Garnett were only 5-foot-8, pudgy and going to work on a newspaper delivery truck, I doubt if many sports journalists would fret about his future." Mike Royko, The World is Doing Wrong to Worry That a Teen Shouldn’t Be, Buffalo News, June 30, 1995, at 18C

Optimism bias likewise provides a useful mode of heuristic analysis by which to gauge decision-making among professional athletes, and how they may not always utilize rational choice. As discussed in Section II, optimism bias reflects the tendency of individuals to assume that general risks do not apply with equal force to themselves. Thus, when contemplating employment opportunities, might professional athletes overestimate the probability of positive outcomes and underestimate the probability of negative outcomes?

Evidence for optimism bias sometimes emerges when professional athletes weigh the relative risk of incentive-laden contracts versus guaranteed contracts, with the former naturally offering greater potential for reward—and loss. For instance, consider the choice of New Orleans Saints’ running back Ricky Williams in 1999 to agree to an eight-year contract worth between $11 million and $68 million, depending upon his capacity to reach certain incentives. At the time, Williams was the fifth overall selection in the 1999 NFL Draft and was negotiating his first NFL contract. As a useful juxtaposition to Williams’ decision-making process, consider that of fellow rookie running back Edgerrin James, who was selected by the Indianapolis Colts with the fourth overall selection and was likewise negotiating his first NFL contract. In striking contrast to Williams’ incentive-laden contract, James agreed to a seven-year contract worth between $44 million and $49 million, with incentives primarily affecting Williams’ potential to void the last year of the contract.

For two players selected at almost the same point in the NFL Draft, the Williams and James contracts appeared of exceptionally disparate values. In fact, performance projections estimated that Williams would earn at least $30 million less than James over the course of the contract. Indeed, for Williams to obtain much of his annual salary, he needed to amass at least 1,600 rushing yards each season, a feat that had only been accomplished by 15 players in the NFL’s 134-year history, and only once by a Saints’ running back in the franchise’s 33-year history. As a result of his apparent “bad gamble,” Williams bore the brunt of considerable ridicule.

In explaining his decision, Williams reasoned that because he believed that he should have been the number one overall selection in the NFL Draft—and thus have warranted a more lucrative contract—the only way for him “to make that kind of money” was to agree to such a heavily-leveraged contract. As to the contract’s seemingly quixotic performance thresholds, Williams appeared undeterred, reasoning that if he performed to his potential, he would readily attain them. Further suggestive of optimism bias, Williams maintained this confidence even after seriously spraining his ankle a week prior to the start of his rookie season. Separately, Williams rationalized the contract by stating that he would use off-field promotional earnings to offset any opportunity costs triggered by unobtainable incentives (without apparently realizing that such off-field earnings would have been available irrespective of contract type).

As predicted by most observers, Williams’ decision proved remarkably unwise. Though he ranked among the top 10 running backs in rushing yards during his first three seasons, he failed to reach most of the onerous performance standards necessary for incentive payment. As a result, he earned far below his market value. This proved most evident in his third season, when despite setting his franchise’s fourth-highest single-season record for rushing yards, and despite being named his team’s “most valuable player,” he earned only $389,000. To put this figure in perspective, consider that thirty-three of his fifty Saints’ teammates earned more that season, or that James—who rushed for fewer yards—earned slightly more than $7 million.

The costly effect of Williams’ optimism bias begs an important question for assessing decision-making among professional athletes: How can player representatives diminish optimism bias and other cognitive biases when their clients seek patently unfavorable terms?

In the case of Williams, a fatal negotiating defect may have existed to prevent such diminishment, as his representative, Percy Miller, had never before represented a professional football player. Indeed, Miller himself appeared the victim of optimism bias, as he dauntlessly assigned the drafting of technical, contractual language to a personal aide who had never before drafted a contract. Nevertheless, more seasoned agents may prove capable in discouraging players from desiring detrimental agreements. In the alternative, and as vividly illustrated by Williams, professional athletes may fail to internalize critical components of the decision-making process, and thus ultimately pursue the non-optimal strategy.

If the coach calls "zero type wing ride," for instance, each player has to know instantly what to do, where his teammates will be going and how to adjust to the other team's behavior. In this environment, low test scores can be a sign that a player may be a "repetition guy," who needs to see something over and over before it sinks in. "You need to 'get it' quick," says Mr. Allen of the Buccaneers. "We don't have a lot of patience in the NFL right now." Floyd Reese, the general manager of the Tennessee Titans, says players who score high on Wonderlic are often better suited to carry out his team's complex defense. Over a period of years, he says, the playbook has grown thick with coverages, combinations and alignments, some of which haven't been used in a year. "Woooh, it's thick!" Mr. Reese says. "I don't know if I could memorize it now. Out of college, no way." In general, Mr. Reese says he prefers smart players who might lose the occasional physical battle over gifted athletes who struggle to learn the system and make silly mistakes.

"We've made a religion of it in the last few years," says Rams coach Mike Martz [The Rams scored the highest of all NFL teams]. "So long as he plays at a high level, we'll always choose a guy that is smarter." To make this offense tick, lineman have to master multiple protection "packages" and some receivers have to learn four positions. It's so complex that the Rams don't even have a playbook: Mr. Martz calls it a "system book" instead. "It's like algebra," he says. "Once you learn the equation, you can solve problems." It seems to work. In six years this offense has led the team to two Super Bowls, set an NFL record for total yards in a season and produced three MVP awards.

I always do exactly what the coach tells me to do.
In athletics one must "either push or be shoved."
I can put up with a conceited fellow athlete fairly well.
During competition it's easy for me to really hate my opponent.
I get tired just thinking about a long, hard practice session.
Athletic competition started just ten years ago.
I enjoy getting into arguments about athletics.