Sports Law Blog
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Wednesday, October 25, 2017
Jews and the 2017 World Series
Some off-the-cuff baseball history.
The 2017 World Series features Jewish players on both teams--Alex Bregman for the Astros and Joc Pederson for the Dodgers. According to Bob Wechsler, author of The Jewish Baseball Card Book, this is the first two-Jew Series since 2004 (Gabe Kapler for the Red Sox and Jason Marquis for the Cardinals); the second since 1959 (when Sandy Koufax played for the Dodgers); and the fifth in history (the other two involved Hank Greenberg in 1945 and 1940).
In Game 2 this evening, Bregman is the Astros regular third baseman, while Pederson will start in left for the Dodgers. This is, as far as I can tell, the first time that both teams have started a Jewish player in a World Series game. Kapler did not start against Marquis in Game 4 in 2004, nor did the Jewish players playing against Koufax and Greenberg.
Bregman homered last night for the Astros' only run. I am trying to figure out who was the last Jewish player to homer in a Series. Greenberg hit 2 in the 1945 World Series. I cannot find any homers since then. Who am I missing and when?
[Update: Naturally, we need a Halachic ruling on the last point: Steve Yeager, the Dodgers catcher in the '70s and early '80s, hit 2 homers in the '77 Series and 2 in the '81 Series (in which he won MVP), but converted to Judaism only after he retired. So he is Jewish, but was not when he hit those 4 homers. Do these count as World Series homers by a Jewish player?]
[Further Update: Pederson homered for the Dodgers’ first run of Game 2, making this the first Series with home runs by multiple Jewish players.]
[One More Update: According to Ron Kaplan, the only Jewish player to homer in the Series between Greenberg in 1945 and Bregman and Pederson this year (if you do not count Yeager) was Ken Holtzman, a pitcher for the A's, who homered in Game 2 of the '74 Series (in researching this by going through a list of Jewish players and their career stats, I did not think to look at any pitchers).]
Wednesday, October 18, 2017
NEW LAW REVIEW ARTICLE -- A Prelude to Jenkins v. NCAA: Amateurism, Antitrust Law, and the Role of Consumer Demand in a Proper Rule of Reason Analysis
As many of you know, on September 30, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association that the National Collegiate Athletic Association violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by prohibiting member colleges from offering their athletes compensation equal to the full cost of their college attendance.
This case opened up the door for a subsequent lawsuit -- Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, which attempts to challenge a broader range of restraints on big-time college athlete pay under antitrust laws. The plaintiffs' lawyers in the Jenkins lawsuit include Jeffrey Kessler, David Greenspan, and other members of the same legal team that regularly represent NFL and NBA players in their labor and antitrust disputes.
I have just completed the final draft of my newest law review article, entitled "A Prelude to Jenkins v. NCAA: Amateurism, Antitrust Law, and the Role of Consumer Demand in a Proper Rule of Reason Analysis." This article looks carefully at the Jenkins litigation, as well as the steps that plaintiffs' lawyers will need to take to secure broader financial rights for college athletes. Among other things, this article looks at the O'Bannon legal teams' failure to show that paying college athletes will not harm consumer demand for big-time college sports and how the legal team in Jenkins may be able to better address that issue.
My newest article, which derives from a presentation I gave last year at LSU Law School, will appear in the upcoming edition of Louisiana Law Review. It will also available for free download here.
Tuesday, October 17, 2017
NFLPA victim of drive-by jurisdictional ruling
The Fifth Circuit last week reversed a district court order enjoining the NFL from carrying out the six-game suspension of Dallas Cowboy running back Ezekiel Elliott because of a domestic-violence incident. I saw the story, but assumed that the court of appeals had reversed for the usual reasons that courts of appeals reverse in these sports cases--the district court had been insufficiently deferential to the arbitrator decision (see, e.g., Tom Brady and Deflategate). And because I do not write on those issues and because I do not like or watch football anymore (and my antipathy for the sport and the league grows), I did not write anything on it.
But a reaction paper from one of my Fed Courts students revealed that the Fifth Circuit issued the dreaded drive-by jurisdictional ruling. A 2-1 divided court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the Elliott and the NFLPA had not exhausted CBA grievance processes, which placed a claim for relief "beyond 'judicial review.'" The court stated that Arbaugh, Henderson, and other recent jurisdictionality decisions did not change SCOTUS or Fifth Circuit precedent treating exhaustion as jurisdictional in the labor context. Judge Graves dissented, arguing that jurisdiction was established when a plaintiff claims a violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization and that the grievance procedures appeared in the CBA, not the LMRA.
Under Scott Dodson's theory (and I think Scott cracked the problem of defining jurisdiction in a principled way),exhaustion is jurisdictional, because it measures when a case can enter a court or move to a court from another body (such as an arbitration panel). But the Fifth Circuit is descriptively wrong under recent decisions and the direction of the doctrine. Very little is jurisdictional anymore, especially when it does not appear in a statute. The "beyond judicial review" language (drawn from a 1967 SCOTUS case) is the sort of loose, figurative language that SCOTUS had used and attached jurisdictional labels, without thinking through the logic or consequences of the label; this is the language Justice Ginsburg had in mind when she introduced, and argued for limiting the effect of, drive-by jurisdictional rulings. And statutory exhaustion (as under Title VII) is not jurisdictional; it seems inconceivable that a statutory requirement would not limit the court's jurisdiction, but a private contractual obligation, not required by any statute, could strip a court of its structural adjudicative authority.
The question is what happens next. Elliott's first game of the suspension is next Sunday. The NFLPA has asked the Fifth Circuit for en banc review and also sought its own TRO in the Southern District of New York (where the NFL offices are located). The jurisdictional basis for the ruling was wrong, but that does not mean that the court of appeals was wrong that Elliott failed to exhaust his contractual remedies and that the injunction should not have issued. Elliott and the NFLPA may have properly lost, just on 12(b)(6) rather than 12(b)(1) grounds.