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Wednesday, July 11, 2012
Armstrong tries again

It only took a day from getting slapped down by a federal district judge to refile his lawsuit against USADA and its CEO, again with claims for tortious interference, common law due process, and Fifth Amendment Due Process. The new pleading is 25 pages and 82 numbered paragraphs--truly short and plain. This suggests that the original complaint was 55 pages and about 180 paragraphs of snark and vitriol.

I want to break down the Fifth Amendment claim because I do not believe it can succeed. I have been writing about state (and federal) action for the past few days, so this story links well to my current work. Here goes.

First, to the extent Armstrong is seeking money damages for the Fifth Amendment violations, this is a Bivens action. But the Supreme Court has in the past decade made clear that neither a private entity nor its employee can be subject to Bivens liability, at least where state remedies are available (as there are here--Armstrong is pursuing them in the same case). Now both Malesko and Minneci were Eighth Amendment claims involving privatized prisons, so maybe this is a different circumstance. But there is a good argument that Bivens now runs only against government officers and joint private-federal participation does not create constitutional liability against private persons as it does under ยง 1983.

Second, even if a Bivens action is possible, I doubt it works here. The complaint alleges four sets of facts aimed at showing joint private-federal participation; most of them do not work. I cannot make this case fit into any of the recognized tests for action under color of law.

    1) Congress was "instrumental" in creating USADA and USADA receives 2/3 of its funding from Congress. Nope. Receipt of government funds, even in large amounts, does not make a private entity a government actor. Think of how much money private hospitals get from Medicare and Medicaid.

    2) "Defendants exercise powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." Nope. Regulating sports is not a traditional government function, nor one it alone has historically done.

    3) USADA conducted its investigation of Armstrong in conjunction with several federal agencies, including DOJ, the FBI, and the FDA. The USADA's case is based on the evidence jointly gathered. This one is closer, because this type of joint operation can be sufficient to make a private actor public. The problem for Armstrong is that the connection must be between the government and the challenged conduct. Armstrong does not challenge the joint investigation itself; he is challenging USADA instituting internal procedures against him for doping. But the federal government plays no role in those procedures or in the establishment of the rules that USADA follows. That the adjuducation relies on government-gathered evidence is not sufficient.

    4) USADA has been delegated authority to regulate and monitor drug-testing, exercising an express power grant of Congress and carrying out federal treaty obligations. Again, closer, but I am not convinced. Mere delegation of power or authorization to act in some area, even to the point of having exclusive power, is not sufficient. Nor is the simple fact that the private entity is doing something the has public import. That USADA is ensuring that the U.S. complies with treaty obligation point is a nice fact, but I do not believe it is enough.

I leave discussion of the tort, contract, and arbitrability issues to smarter hands. In the meantime, is there something else I am missing?


Are grand jury proceedings confidential? Does it matter if the government shared information with the USADA ?

Anonymous Anonymous -- 7/11/2012 7:50 PM  

They are confidential while they are going on, they routinely are opened once proceedings are done.

No, it doesn't matter that the government shared information.

Blogger Howard Wasserman -- 7/11/2012 11:29 PM  

I think what's troubling me is that I'm not sure I understand exactly what Armstrong (or other athletes) are entitled to generally. Is participation in UCI-sponsored events somehow not analogous to employment at will? Could UCI on its own just say "We don't like Lance Armstrong anymore, so we're stripping him of his titles and forbidding him from participating in future competitions"? If not, why not? What creates a legal right in Armstrong to maintain his titles and compete in future events? I think its hard to analyze Armstrong's complaint without understanding the source of the rights he claims (which I don't see in a brief perusal of the amended complaint). To complain of a due process violation suggests some sort of property right; to complain of a tortious interference suggests some sort of contract right (between Armstrong and UCI). I'm not sure I understand the basis for either.

Professional Legal Network

Blogger Professional Legal Network -- 10/13/2012 4:52 AM  

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